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COMMENTS
Foreign Objects and Doctors' Liability
Today it is highly recognized that surgeons are liable for leaving
foreign objects in the bodies of their patients. Dentists are also being sued
for malpractice. Statistics in 1960 showed that over 10,000 malpractice
suits were filed in the United States. The number of satisfied claims in-
creased eighty-four per cent from 1954 to 1959. These changes were
reflected in malpractice insurance coverages. Medical practitioners are
urged to take out malpractice insurance which generally ranges from four
hundred to six hundred dollars per year.'
The aim of this comment is to alert the public concerning doctors'
liability for their failure to remove objects or substances inserted, in-
tentionally or unintentionally, in the patient's body in the course of surgery
or treatment without the intention of leaving them there permanently.
Foreign objects are often found in the bodies of patients. The fault
is often that of the surgeons as well as of others. Generally, it is the
physician's or surgeon's duty to remove the foreign body because inex-
pert removal by another may prove to be dangerous. If it is very large, the
foreign -body is likely to be embedded in the large blood vessels, and re-
moval might easily lead to hemorrhage. Removing the body might also
cause the breaking off of splinters or dirt fragments which would irri-
tate the tissues and cause swelling, and cover the foreign matter in such
a way as to make the care of the patient difficult.
A physician or surgeon is held to the requisite degree of learning,
skill and ability necessary to the practice of his profession and he must
apply those facilities with ordinary care and diligence in every case.2
One can recover against a physician or surgeon who does not exercise
his best judgment, reasonable care, and diligence in the application of
knowledge and skill to his patients' care. If the physician's lack of reason-
able care and diligence is the proximate cause of the patient's injury, he is
civilly liable for the consequences. 3
These are the three common methods of preventing operating room
'Russel V. Lee. The Physician (1969).
'See Mullinax v. Hard, 174 N.C. 607, 94 S.E. 426 (1917); Nash v. Royster,
189 N.C. 408, 127 S.E. 356 (1925).
'Belk v. Schweizer, 149 S.E.2d 565 (1966).
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objects from being left in a surgical wound: (1) sponge or instrument
counts, (2) attachments on laparotomy pads and on drains and tubings,4
and (3) X-rays taken at the time of the operation, sometimes made more
effective by the use of radio-paque threads in sponges and pads. X-rays
are also one of the post-operative methods of detecting foreign objects
left in an operative wound.
The failure to follow an established procedure such as a sponge or
instrument count may be evidence of negligence, but it has been held not
negligent to omit a sponge count in operations where sponge counts are
not customary.' If a sponge count indicates that a sponge is missing and
it is not found before the operative wound is closed, this may be evidence
of negligence,6 depending on the efforts made to discover the sponge and
the patient's condition.7 On the other hand, the fact that a sponge or
instrument is missing does not in and of itself establish that the operating
surgeon did not exercise due care to prevent a sponge or instrument from
remaining in the operative wound.'
In a number of cases it has been held that even though a foreign object
was non-negligently left in the patient's body the operating surgeon or
dentist was liable for failing to discover or remove the foreign object
within a reasonable time. Also the courts have held that where an op-
erating surgeon had reason to suspect the presence of a foreign object
in his patient's body and failed to advise that x-rays be taken for the
purpose of discovering the object is evidence of his negligence.' Even
where x-rays were taken by a defendant surgeon disclosing the presence
of a foreign object in the body of his patient, evidence that earlier taking
of x-rays might have prevented substantial injury to the patient has been
held sufficient to support a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. In an-
other case it was held that where an operating surgeon leaves a foreign
object in his patient's -body during the operation and immediately there-
'See McLennan v. Holder, 36 P.2d 448 (1934).
'Landsberg v. Kolodny, 302 P.2d 448 (1956).
'See Smedra v. Stanek, 187 F.2d 892 (1951).
'Rayburn v. Day, 268 P 1002 (1928) wherein the court held that where an
operating surgeon was told that one of the sponges was missing and the surgeon
made a manual examination of the operative field for the sponge without success
and closed the incision, such procedure was sufficient to sustain a jury verdict for
the defendant because of the poor condition of the patient. See also Ruble v.
Busby, 149 P. 722 (1926).
'Winchester v. Chabut, 32 N.W.2d 358 (1948).
'Harris v. Fall, 177 F. 79 (1910).
0 Fairley v. Douglas, 76 So. 2d 576 (1955) ; Pasquale v. Chandler, 214 N.E. 2d
319 (1966); Mitchell v. Saunders, 13 S.E.2d 242 (1941); Hunt v. Bradshaw, 88
S.E.2d 762 (1955).
2
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after discovers this fact, he is justified in immediately operating on the
patient to remove the object, even without the consent of the patient or
other person authorized to give such consent."
Courts apply different doctrines or rules relative to a physician's
liability for not removing the foreign body from the patient's body. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is the most popular doctrine, which calls for
medical evidence that pieces of the foreign body had been allowed to re-
main in the patient. Also one might go some steps farther by entering
into evidence that if one were to leave a foreign body in a patient, sound
practice dictates that x-rays should be taken some time after the operation
to ascertain its location and its involvements. The moving party would
have to allege that this was not done in order to hold the physician or
surgeon liable.' 2 The plaintiff's lawyer should, if possible, show that the
plaintiff was under an anesthetic at the time of the operation, in order to
explain his lack of knowledge that the foreign object was present. He
should prove the effect of the foreign matter and show the defendant's
prognosis after the operation, in order to demonstrate that something
was wrong and that the defendant had notice of it. He should also show
that the pain disappeared after the object was removed. As elements of
damages, the plaintiff's attorney should show pain and suffering due to
the presence of the foreign object, anxiety due to pain around vital or-
gans, and shortening of the patient's life expectancy.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may not be invoked merely because
a patient is not cured or because aggravation follows treatment. Common
experience teaches that cure is never certain and aggravation is possible
even though proper care is used. A doctor is neither a warrantor of cures
nor an insurer.' 3 Moreover, fright by medically warranted advice is not
actionable. 4 Where reasonable doubt exists as to the proper treatment
to pursue, an inference of negligence is not ordinarily raised from honest
mistake or errors in judgment.'"
In cases where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is found inapplicable,
judges have based their opinion on evidence of negligence. In Holt v.
" An example is Delahunt v. Finton, 221 N.W. 168 (1928), where the court
affirmed a judgment on a verdict for the defendant and held that it was well settled
that a surgeon may lawfully perform, and it is his duty to perform, such operation
as good surgery demands in cases of emergency without consent of the patient.
12 See Cassingham v. Berry, 168 P. 1020 (1915).
" Pendergraft v. Royster, 166 S.E. 285 (1932) ; Davis v. Pittner, 194 S.E. 97
(1937).
" Kraus v. Spielberg, 137 Misc. (N.Y.) 2d 519 (1962).
" Brewer v. Ring, 99 S.E. 358 (1919).
3
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Nesbitt"8 the plaintiff died as a result of a sponge becoming lodged in his
trachea, while under an anesthetic, during the course of extracting several
teeth by the defendant dentist. The evidence disclosed that during the
course of extractions the patient suddenly became pale. It was found
that nitrous oxide gas was the only anesthetic that deadened patient's
gums and everything was done to save the patient. The defendant dentist
was of the opinion that he had removed all of the sponges placed in the
patient's mouth except a portion of one which had torn, and which was
visible. Subsequently, the autopsy disclosed a large blood-soaked sponge
or swab of folded gauze which completely obstructed the air passage and
prevented the deceased from breathing. The defendant was held liable.
Two judges held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable and
the third judge held that there was evidence of negligence on the part of
the defendant thereby making the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur unnecessary. The judge who found evidence of negligence on
the part of the defendant stated that
* . . the question arises why a prudent man, without the advantages of
any special skill, should not have anticipated that the unfortunate mis-
hap might have been caused by one of the swabs or sponges which
had been used during the operation, blocking the passage of air or
oxygen into the patient's lungs.
17
In addition it was this judge's opinion that some effort should have been
made to remove the obstacle.
An Indiana case' 8 is another example where the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur was not applied. Plaintiff brought an action against a dentist
for alleged negligence in breaking a hypodermic needle and allowing it
to remain in plaintiff's jaw. The court held that res ipsa loquitur was
not applicable in the absence of evidence that the needle was defective,
not of a type commonly used by dentists, that it was used in a careless
or negligent manner, or that it was not used according to the usual prac-
tice of skilled dentists. There was also a total lack of evidence by lay or
expert witnesses that defendant was negligent in inserting the needle
into the jaw of the plaintiff.
For any act of negligence the court can find liability. A physician or
surgeon is liable for the consequences if the error in judgment is so gross
1 D.L.R. 671 (1953).1 161 S.E. 91 (1931). See Robinson v. Ferguson, 22 N.E.2d 901 (1939),
Hawkins v. McClain, 79 S.E.2d 493 (1954).
1826 Va. L.R. 919 (1940).
4
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as to be inconsistent with the exercise of that degree of skill and care
which is his duty to apply. The failure to give needed continued care
under an obligation to do so constitutes negligence or malpractice. If
one could show that the physician or surgeon did not give reasonable
notice or provide a competent physician in his place he could hold the
doctor liable for increased pain and suffering resulting therefrom.'9 In
Reeves v. North Broward Hospital District20 the jury found that the
hospital employee did not exercise such reasonable care toward deceased
as his known condition required. It has been stated in an article entitled
"Doctor and Patient and the Law" by Lewis J. Reagon that one of
the purposes for which the appellant was employed was to exercise
his 'best judgment as to the means of relieving intense pain of the appellee,
it was not only his duty to relieve that pain but necessary to do so in order
to permit a determination of the cause.2 '
The courts have become more acutely aware of the need to protect an
injured patient by inducing the physician to explain the reason for the
injury or suffer the penalty of an adverse inference in the absence of such
explanation. Generally, an inference is raised if the doctor leaves some
debris in the plaintiff's body that the doctor did not exercise due care.
Another doctrine that the courts adhere to is the doctrine of com-
mon knowledge. It is a doctrine closely related to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. The doctrine of common knowledge is also used by the courts
to enable plaintiffs to get their cases submitted to the jury. The effect of
applying this doctrine is to allow the jury to supply the applicable standard
of care and thus to obviate the necessity for expert testimony. The jury,
from its fund of common knowledge, assays the feasibility of possible
precautions which the defendant might have taken to avoid leaving the
foreign body in the patient which caused injury to him.
If the doctor does not remove the foreign body, the court may apply
either of the following rules: (1) community standard rule, (2) the
customary or locality rule, or (3) the similar community rule. In nearly
all jurisdictions a doctor is protected from malpractice suits if he does what
his colleagues do, particularly if the non-weakening insular rule of the
community standard is also applied.
The purpose of the community rule is to limit the liability of doctors
by preventing the higher standards of other doctors in other communities
19 Howell v. Jackson, 16 S.E.2d 45 (1941).
, 0See 191 So. 2d 307 (1966).
91 Id.
5
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from being imposed on local practitioners.22 In Brensden v. Johnson23
the plaintiff was unable to talk as a result of choking and strangling, but
continued to write notes begging anyone who came into the room to please
look into his throat. Expert testimony revealed that it was not common
medical practice for doctors to disregard symptoms; that ordinarily in
cases like the instant case a physician or surgeon would call a throat
specialist within a few hours so that he would make a search for some-
thing that was causing the difficulty. The decision was based on the fact
that the defendant did not use that degree of skill and diligence ordinarily
administered by physicians in the community coupled with nonexpert
testimony that plaintiff's symptoms were readily discernible by lay wit-
nesses, to support a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.24
The customary or locality rule has been bitterly attacked in much of
legal literature. It is indirectly responsible for the broadening of the
locality rule. Louisiana v. Aetna Casualty Company5 is cited as dictum
to show how the court treated the customary rule. Here the defendant's
(radiologist) defense of customary practice was rejected by the court
and the finding was for the plaintiff. The court held that to relieve a
member of the medical profession from liability for injury to a patient on
the ground that he followed a degree or standard of care practiced by
others in the same locality was unthinkable when the degree or standard
of care in question constituted negligence because it failed to meet the test
of reasonable care and diligence required of the medical profession. It is
believed that the results would have been the same had the defendant left
a foreign body in the plaintiff. Most attacks on the customary rule are
based on widening the scope of inquiry beyond the defendant's own com-
munity.
The first departure from the customary rule was a widening to in-
clude similar communities. This was partly to broaden liability, but it
was mainly a forced recognition of the need to allow the plaintiff to go
outside of the defendant's own home town to seek a medical witness to
testify against him.
In Delahunt v. Finton26 the court said that in order to submit a case
" Robert v. Young, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963), DiFileppo v. Preston, 173 A.2d
333 (1961), Visingardi v. Tirone, 178 So. 2d 135 (1965), Wilson v. Scott, 412
S.W.2d 299 (1967), Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421 (1962).
28255 P.2d 1033 (1953).2 1 Id. at 1039.
144 So. 2d 544 (1962).26221 N.W. 168 (1928).
6
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of alleged malpractice to the jury, the plaintiff must produce medical
testimony to the effect that what the attending physician or surgeon did
was contrary to the practice in that or similar communities, or that he
omitted doing something which was ordinarily done in that or similar
communities, and that the jury determines and disposes of disputed ques-
tions of fact. In rejecting a contention that the trial court erred in sub-
mitting the question of what constituted malpractice, the court said that
malpractice, in its ordinary sense, is the negligent performance by a
physician or surgeon of the duties devolving upon him on account of his
contractual relations with his patient, and the trial court's charge was
in substantial conformity with this definition.
Some states such as Massachusetts have refused to allow a doctor
from another state to testify in a malpractice suit." The Nevada Supreme
Court is even narrower in its interpretation than Massachusetts. How-
ever, it imposes the same locality rule and requires the witness of that
locality to demonstrate his knowledge of such standards by having prac-
ticed there or by having been in that locality, apparently with an oppor-
tunity actually to observe medical standards. Most recently, this rule
was reaffirmed by the Nevada Court in a case where an Oakland, Cali-
fornia doctor was denied the opportunity to testify against a Reno, Ne-
vada practitioner.2"
A few states have passed decisions which depart from the locality
and similar locality rules and broaden the inquiry to a large area, geo-
graphically around certain large metropolitan areas. Viita v. Dolan is a
leading case in this field with very liberal language to the effect that the
standard may be the whole state or the entire northwest, but later cases
have qualified this broad holding. 9 It would seem that in most of these
states, limited facilities or isolation of the defendant's community may
well still be taken into consideration as one, though no longer the con-
trolling, index of the standard of care to be applied.
Few physicians are willing to state on the witness stand that a fellow
physician's conduct did not meet the legal standard of care and even
if the plaintiff finds such a witness, he will often be faced with an array
of opposing medical experts.30 In order to hold a doctor liable for not
removing a foreign body one should attempt to produce a medical special-
See Coburn v. Moore, 68 N.E.2d 5 (1946).
28 Lockhart v. Maclean, 361 P.2d 670 (1961).
29 Viita v. Dolan, 155 N.W. 1077 (1916).
Slago v. Leland Stranford, 317 P.2d 170, 175 (1957), Billi, An Ancient
Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Treatment, 1 Vill. L. Rev. 1019 (1961).
7
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ist to defeat any other conflicting testimony. Also in Alabama it would
be advantageous to enter into evidence, if applicable to the facts, medical
books to prove the truth of the statements made by the medical special-
ist."' Another tactic is the use of the defendant's own testimony, but it is
dangerous for even the proficient trial lawyer to attempt to secure damag-
ing admissions from a confident and articulate physician who believes that
his entire career depends on his testimony.
Furthermore, it has been held that a surgeon is liable to his patient
for injury that results from the surgeon's negligence in connection with a
foreign object other than cloth material or a surgical instrument left in
the patient's arm, leg, or other extremity. In holding the evidence sufficient
to sustain a jury verdict for the -plaintiff, the court in White v. Burton32
pointed to evidence of the plaintiff's expert witnesses that in view of its
size, the insertion of a -beef-bone -peg (which had been inserted by de-
fendant in plaintiff's leg in an effort to maintain apposition and align-
ment and to achieve union in a fractured tibia) was bound to act as a
foreign body and to irritate the plaintiff's leg. Also it would interfere
with the function of the medullary canal, attributing deleterious effects
by permitting the peg to slip out of place and into the lower fragment
and remain there for some time. The court stated that this evidence, to-
gether with other evidence of plaintiff's experts, was sufficient, although
it was contradicted by evidence on behalf of the defendant, to make out a
case for the jury.
From the foregoing discussion, one can conclude that a physician is
assumed to have the skill required by his profession and he has a duty
to exercise such skill with due care in the treatment of his patients. This
includes not leaving foreign objects in the bodies of his patients and re-
moving those that are left unknowingly. Also, the physician should take
precautionary measures such as sponge or instrument counts and X-rays
taken before and after the operation in order to reduce the possibility of
facing a malpractice suit based on negligence which could result in the
physician being adjudged liable.
JOSEPH ASKEW
SI 122 So. 416 (1929).
White v. Burton, 71 P.2d 694 (1937).
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